Designing A Formal Textualist Theory Of Statutory...

Can a corrective approach to Scrivener’s Error find conceptual room in a formal textualist theory of statutory interpretation? 1. Introduction. 2. The incompatibility of correction in intent-skeptical textualism. i) A negative account approved: Siegel’s axiom. ii) A positive account rejected: Manning’s attempt. 3. The incompatibility of non-intent-skepticism and faithful agency: a response to Ohlendorf. i) Getting Raz wrong: a theory built on sand. ii) Getting Raz right: in support of skepticism. 4. Conclusion. 1.Introduction This essay will conclude there is no conceptual room for a corrective approach to scrivener’s error in a textualist theory of statutory interpretation. To do so I will seek to establish two main premises, from which necessarily follows my conclusion: The first main premise states that an error cannot be judicially corrected in an intent-skeptical theory of textualism. I will establish this by supporting Siegel’s axiomatic rejection of correction and by critiquing Manning’s attempt to find justification for correction in textualism. The second main premise states that conceptions of textualism that employ non-intent-skepticism in order to correct errors do so in contravention of the core textualist principle of faithful agency: therefore non-intent-skeptical justifications are not rightly textualist. By way of example of the pitfalls of attempting to reconcile non-intent-skepticism with faithful agency I will examine what I consider the most